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I. Structure of the Directive 
Processing of personal data by police and criminal justice authorities was, until recently, 
not an activity that caught a lot of attention of academia and practitioners2. Laws regulating such 
processing were perceived as dry, technical and fragmented3. Furthermore, these are not provisions 
concerning commercial activities generating income and affecting consumers of services, which 
was another reason reducing their attractiveness. 
Although there is a lack of research covering regulations for the processing of personal data in the 
law enforcement sector, there is no doubt that such rules are rapidly gaining importance and 
visibility. There are at least three factors4 contributing to the allure of previously neglected legal 
texts: firstly, an increased number of criminal acts is being committed online or with the help of 
online tools. Perpetrators of crime leave digital traces that may support law enforcement authorities 
(LEAs) in their tasks of crime prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution. Data collection 
and data exchanges progressively gained in importance for successful police work. Secondly, as 
perpetrators are becoming more tech-savvy, LEAs turned to new investigative techniques, 
including big data analytics. The term big data police technologies may include predictive systems 
that identify people or places suspected of crime, surveillance systems to monitor at-risk areas and 
search systems to mine data for investigative clues or to develop intelligence nets of helpful data 
for groups or across communities.5 Thirdly, EU rules (both the patchwork of data protection rules 
adopted under the former third pillar6 and the rules for EU Justice and Home Affairs Agencies7) 
on the processing of personal data by LEAs are undergoing consolidation, with Directive (EU) 
2016/6808 (LED) acting as a locomotive. 
                                                 
2 However, very important work in this area was carried out by some academics in the past. In particular, see Franziska Boehm 
‘Information sharing and data protection in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice – Towards harmonised data protection 
principles for EU-internal information exchange’, Springer 2012; Paul de Hert, Vagelis Papakonstantinou and Cornelia Riehle 
‘Data protection in the third pillar: cautious pessimism’, in Martin Maik (Editor), Crime, Rights and the EU: The Future of Police 
and Judicial Cooperation, London, Publisher: Justice, 2008, (196p.) 121-194; Diana Alonso Blas, First pillar and third pillar: need 
for a common approach on data protection? In: Gutwirth, S., ‘Reinventing Data Protection?’, pp. 225–237. Springer, Berlin 
(2009). 
3 See: Paul de Hert and Vagelis Papakonstantinou ‘Data protection policies in EU Justice and Home Affairs. A multi-layered and 
yet unexplored territory for legal research’, in Ariadna Ripoll Servent & Florian Trauner (eds), Routledge Handbook of Justice and 
Home Affairs Research, Routledge, London, 2018, 169-179 and Nadia Purtova (2017), ‘Between GDPR and the Police Directive: 
Navigating through the maze of information sharing in Public-Private Partnership’, available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2930078. 
4 See: Paul de Hert and Juraj Sajfert ‘Police, privacy and data protection from a comparative legal perspective” in Monica den Boer 
(editor), “Comparative policing’, Edwar Elgar Publishing, forthcoming in 2018. 
5 Andrew Guthrie Ferguson ‘The Rise of Big Data Policing. Surveillance, Race, and the Future of Law Enforcement’, NY: New 
York University Press, 2017, p.272. 
6 According to Article 62(6) of the LED, the instruments such as the Council Decision 2008/615/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the 
stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime, OJ L210/1 (6 
August 2008), the Council Decision 2008/616/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the implementation of Decision 2008/615/JHA on 
the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime, OJ L210/12 (6 
August 2008), or the Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA of 18 December 2006 on simplifying the exchange of 
information and intelligence between law enforcement authorities of the Member States of the European Union, OJ 
L386/89 (29 December 2006) should be aligned with the LED by 6 May 2019. 
7 See Chapter IX of the Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of natural 
persons with regard to the processing of personal data by the Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and on the free 
movement of such data, and repealing Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 and Decision No 1247/2002/EC, OJ L 295, 21.11.2018. 
8 Directive (EU) 2016/680 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons 
with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection 
or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, and repealing 
Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 89–131. 
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Like the GDPR, the LED was adopted in May 2016, constituting a major step forward in 
establishing a comprehensive EU data protection regime, as the first horizontal and legally binding 
instrument laying down the rules for national and cross-border processing of personal data in the 
area of law enforcement.9 Moreover, the LED is a modern instrument, designed for LEAs 
processing personal data in the Digital Age.10 As the second part of the data protection reform 
package that had been under discussion for four years, the Directive received way less attention 
than the GDPR. However, two main objectives of the Directive are too important to be neglected: 
the increased level of fundamental rights protection in the area of police and criminal justice, and 
the improved sharing of personal data between the Member States, as they will be able to rely on 
uniform data protection rules (Article 1(2)). The Directive is the successor to the 2008 Framework 
Decision 200811, which had a much more limited scope and solely applied to cross-border data 
processing between the Member States.12 The rules of the Directive, which had to be transposed 
into the national laws of all 28 Member States and the four Schengen Area States (Norway, 
Iceland, Switzerland and Lichtenstein)13 by May 2018 benefited from the attention given to the 
GDPR, as some of the Regulation’s solutions could simply be taken over. However, a number of 
provisions were developed specifically for the Directive.  
I.1. Meandering between the Directive and the GDPR 
One of the most important provisions of the Directive is to be found at its very beginning. 
Article 1(1) defines the scope of the Directive, which is crucial for a clear delineation between the 
Directive and the GDPR. In order for the Directive to be applicable, both its personal and material 
scope have to be met. In other words, the processing must be carried out by a competent authority 
(personal scope) for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of 
criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, including the safeguarding against and 
the prevention of threats to public security (material scope) (Articles 1(1) and 2(1) respectively). 
Whenever a police officer processes data for non-law enforcement purposes, for instance, and as 
the most obvious example, HR data or information that is to be archived, the GDPR will apply. 
Yet, in other areas where LEAs may be competent to process personal data, the delineation 
between the Directive and the GDPR is not as apparent. This might be the case in situations where 
police officers process personal data for identification or verification purposes in the field of 
migration and border control. A person crossing the Schengen borders irregularly might be 
checked by a police officer and, in those Member States where the irregular crossing of borders 
qualifies as a criminal offence, the police officer may change the purpose of the processing, 
depending on whether it is carried out for migration purposes or for prosecuting the criminal 
offence. However, once the irregular migrant applies for asylum, the processing of his application 
will fall within the scope of the GDPR, notwithstanding the initiated criminal proceedings. This 
demonstrates not only the complexity of the scoping exercise between the GDPR and the Directive, 
                                                 
9 See: Thomas Marquenie ‘The Police and Criminal Justice Authorities Directive: Data protection standards and impact on the 
legal framework’, Computer Law & Security Review, 33 (2017), 324-340. 
10 Cf.: Paul de Hert and Juraj Sajfert ‘Police, privacy and data protection from a comparative legal perspective’, 2018. 
11 Council Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the protection of personal data processed in the framework 
of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, OJ L 350, 30.12.2008, p. 60–71. 
12 On the shortcomings of the Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA, cf.: Paul De Hert and Vagelis Papakonstantinou, ‘The data 
protection framework decision of 27 November 2008 regarding police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters — A modest 
achievement however not the improvement some have hoped for’, (2009) 25 Computer Law & Security Review 403. 
13 The Directive is a development of provisions of the Schengen acquis. See recitals 101, 102 and 103. 
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but also the intricacy of competent authorities applying two different legal regimes, depending on 
the purpose of the processing.  
I.2. Minor offences: a stumbling block of harmonisation 
 Several national legislators, in the exercise of transposing the LED, interpret its Recital 
(12) in a way that opens the possibility to include minor offences within the scope of the Directive. 
In other Member States, all types of offences are considered criminal offences and thus, trigger 
the applicability of the Directive in a general manner. Most of the Member States, however, will 
apply the Directive solely to classic criminal offences; consequently, in those Member States the 
GDPR will be applicable to minor offences. Such differentiated reading, also with regard to the 
determination of authorities that fall within Article 2(1) generally, and from what point they act as 
genuine LEAs that carry out processing for law enforcement purposes more specifically, leads to 
a fragmented delineation between the GDPR and the Directive across Member States, which is an 
undesirable result, as the reform’s objective is the harmonization of data protection rules across 
the Union. 
I.3. Blurred lines between law enforcement and national security 
In accordance with the above, the Directive should apply only if both the personal and the 
material scope are satisfied. If one of the two criteria is not met, either the GDPR or other EU 
instruments14 will apply, unless the processing is being performed for purposes falling completely 
out of scope of EU law, in which case none of the EU Regulations/Directives will be applicable 
(for example, when a military intelligence service is collecting data about persons plotting to 
threaten the national security of a country by destroying its crucial army bases). Although the legal 
basis of Article 16 TFEU, on which both the GDPR and the Directive were adopted, is very strong 
and not a lot of processing activities will fall outside the scope of EU law, the latter does not cover 
processing carried out by national intelligence and military agencies. This may become 
problematic where a clear delineation between the different tasks of intelligence agencies is 
lacking. Therefore, when national intelligence agencies process data for the purposes of the 
Directive, they should be viewed as competent authorities under Article 2(1) instead of not being 
covered by EU law. This issue becomes even more relevant in the context of information sharing 
between national intelligence agencies and LEAs. 
I.4. Croquis of the Directive 
The following section will briefly explain the structure of the Directive and underline both 
its differences and similarities with regard to the provisions of the GDPR. 
The Directive, just like the GDPR, is divided in ten chapters. Three chapters, I (general provisions), 
IV (controller and processor) and VI (independent supervisory authorities) are closely linked to 
the GDPR, incorporating a number of the latter’s provisions. 
Chapter I reiterates a number of definitions from the GDPR and defines the scope of the Directive, 
which has been discussed above. It also explains that the Directive is not a full harmonisation 
instrument, allowing Member States to introduce higher data protection safeguards from the 
minimum standards required by the Directive.  
                                                 
14 For instance, Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 if the processing is carried out by Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies, or 
more specific legal regimes, such as the Europol Regulation (EU) 2016/794. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3285873 
Cole/Boehm GDPR Commentary (forthcoming Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019) Sajfert / Quintel 
5 
 
Chapter IV, just like the GDPR, introduces the risk-based approach and a number of new 
obligations for controllers and processors that resemble the ones stipulated in the GDPR (data 
protection by design and by default, DPIA, notifications of personal data breaches, obligation to 
appoint a DPO). The Chapter also establishes a duty to keep logs of certain processing operations 
(Article 25), which is a specific obligation under the Directive and a very important tool to monitor 
whether law enforcement databases are used lawfully. On that account, part II.3 of this contribution 
will devote more attention to this particular obligation. 
Chapter VI lays down the same requirements as the GDPR regarding the independence of national 
supervisory authorities and the conditions for the appointment of its members. The Directive 
leaves it to the Member States whether they establish one supervisory authority competent for the 
application of both the GDPR and the Directive, or separate supervisory authorities that are 
responsible for either the Directive or the GDPR. Besides the restriction for the supervisory 
authorities to supervise courts acting in their judicial capacity (Article 45(2)), Member States may 
add further independent judicial authorities to be exempted from the administrative supervision of 
supervisory authorities when acting in their judicial capacity. The latter, optional exemption is 
designed for national authorities that maintain an equivalent level of independence to that of courts 
and judges15. 
Two chapters, VII (co-operation) and VIII (remedies, liability and penalties) endorse several 
provisions of the GDPR, while omitting the GDPR’s provisions on the one-stop-shop, the 
consistency mechanism, provisions on the dispute resolution by the EDPB, joint operations of the 
supervisory authorities or the administrative fines under Article 83 of the GDPR. These notable 
omissions are due to the more basic structure of the Directive, resulting from the Council’s 
anxiousness to keep the supervision of the police and criminal justice authorities within the 
exclusive remit of the respective national supervisory authority, without the meddling of a 
supervisory authority from one Member State into another Member State’s police work.16 
Three chapters: II (principles), III (rights of the data subject) and V (international transfers) 
strongly diverge from their equivalent provisions in the GDPR. They are specifically designed for 
the needs of LEAs and the particular nature of their processing activities. This is in line with the 
specificities of data processing by police and criminal justice authorities, recognised in Declaration 
2117 attached to the Treaty of Lisbon. On the other hand, those chapters may be perceived as 
weakening the overall level of protection given to data subjects in EU law and offering too much 
leeway to police and criminal justice authorities, compared to the remainder of the public sector 
covered by the GDPR. 
In Chapter II, already at the level of principles of processing defined in Article 4 are some 
important differences compared to the GDPR. Firstly, the Directive does not refer to further 
processing, but instead introduces the notion of subsequent processing by the same or another 
controller in paragraphs 2 and 3. In the law enforcement context, such processing is generally 
deemed compatible with the purposes of the initial data collection (if the collection was also carried 
                                                 
15 Cf.: Paul de Hert & Juraj Sajfert, ‘The role of the data protection authorities in supervising police and criminal justice authorities 
processing personal data’, in: Briere, C. and Weyembergh, A (eds), The needed balances in EU Criminal law: past, present and 
future, 2017, Hart Publishing, p.250. 
16 Ibid, p. 253. 
17 ‘The Conference acknowledges that specific rules on the protection of personal data and the free movement of such data in the 
fields of judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation based on Article 16 of the Treaty on the Functioning of 
the European Union may prove necessary because of the specific nature of these fields.’ 
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out for the purposes of the Directive), if authorized by law and if necessary and proportionate to 
the new purpose, to the extent that the new purpose remains within the scope of the Directive. 
Another notable difference is the principle of data minimisation (Article 4(1)(c)). Under the 
Directive, personal data should be adequate, relevant and not excessive, rather than adequate, 
relevant and limited to what is necessary, as stipulated under Article 5(1)(c) GDPR. Both 
principles grant more flexibility to LEAs in the performance of their tasks compared to the 
requirements of the corresponding provisions under the GDPR. 
Furthermore, Article 6 introduces a specific obligation for controllers under the Directive to 
establish a clear distinction between personal data of different categories of data subjects (suspects, 
convicts, victims, witnesses). The LEAs therefore have to neatly tag and properly organise their 
databases, in line with the jurisprudence of the ECtHR18. Another principle specific to the 
Directive is laid down in Article 7, requiring personal data based on facts to be distinguished from 
personal data based on personal assessment. Additionally, the quality, accuracy, completeness and 
reliability of personal data have to be verified and properly indicated before data exchanges with 
other authorities may take place.19 As regards the basis for the lawfulness of processing, the 
Directive lays down only one legal ground in Article 8 (if necessary for the performance of a task 
carried out by a competent authority for the purposes of the Directive and based on Union or 
Member State law), while Article 6 of the GDPR provides for six different legal bases. Obviously, 
the legislator recognized that LEAs may only carry out tasks permitted by law, and not process 
data for the purposes of the Directive on the basis of consent, contractual obligations or the 
controller’s legitimate interest. 
Article 9 is another very specific provision of the Directive, with two different sets of rules. Firstly, 
paragraphs 1 and 2 provide the rules for interactions between the Directive and the GDPR. 
Secondly, paragraphs 3 and 4 authorise specific processing conditions to be attached to transmitted 
data. These conditions, however, may not be more stringent for the authorities of the receiving 
Member State than the conditions that are imposed on the authorities of the Member State 
transmitting the data.20 With regard to the processing of special categories of data (‘sensitive 
data’), Article 10 of the Directive, unlike Article 9 of the GDPR, does not establish a prohibition 
in principle. It allows the processing of sensitive data, but only where strictly necessary and 
subject to appropriate safeguards for the rights and freedoms of the data subjects. These are two 
important requirements added alongside the general lawfulness requirements pursuant to Article 
8. Finally, Article 11 on automated individual decision-making was placed in Chapter II of the 
Directive instead of Chapter III, where one can find its GDPR equivalent. Apart from this 
organizational difference, the Article has some distinct features compared to Article 22 GDPR, 
which will be explained in part II.1. of this chapter. 
Compared to the more ‘generalist’ Articles of Chapter III of the GDPR, the approach towards data 
subject rights and their possible limitations under Chapter III of the Directive is circumscribed in 
more detail, in order to adapt the means of processing personal data to the needs of LEAs. The 
basic set of rights remains the same (information, access, rectification, erasure, restriction of 
processing) and those rights may be exercised directly against the data controller. Understandably 
                                                 
18 See ECtHR App nos 30562/04 and 30566/04 S and Marper v United Kingdom (4 December 2008)2008] . 
19 A good example of how this can be done in practice was developed in Article 29 of the Europol Regulation (EU) 2016/794 where 
different handling codes have to be attached to transmitted data, depending on the level of their reliability and accuracy. 
20 This is a police cooperation rule introduced in EU law by the so-called Swedish Initiative in 2006 - Council Framework Decision 
2006/960/JHA of 18 December 2006 on simplifying the exchange of information and intelligence between law enforcement 
authorities of the Member States of the European Union, OJ L 386, 29.12.2006, p. 89–100. 
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the Directive does not provide for GDPR rights that were primarily designed to be exercised 
against commercial operators, such as the right to be forgotten or the right to data portability. The 
controller may limit the right of specific information to be given to the data subject, the right of 
access and the right to obtain information about the possible refusal of rectification, erasure or 
restriction of processing in a similar way as under Article 23 GDPR, i.e. if there is a legislative 
measure allowing for the limitation and if the limitation is necessary and proportionate. The 
grounds for such limitations are much narrower than under the GDPR and closely linked to the 
purposes of the Directive.21 Given that the controllers may limit not only the rights, but also the 
information about the refusal to grant a certain right, a number of data subjects will receive a 
neutral reply. It is very difficult, or even impossible, to challenge such replies before courts, as 
data subjects will not be able to formulate what exactly they are referring to in potential complaints. 
This is why Article 17 provides for an independent review by the supervisory authority and the 
exercise of data subject rights indirectly, through the intermediary of the DPA. Article 17 will be 
further analysed in Part II.2 of this contribution. Finally, Article 18 allows Member States to lay 
down rules for the exercise of data subject rights in criminal proceedings in accordance with the 
provisions of the national criminal procedural laws. That means that the Directive is fully 
applicable to criminal proceedings, but since Member States’ criminal procedural codes already 
provide for rules on information, access, rectification, erasure and restriction of processing, the 
provision recognises such codes as correct transposition efforts. 
In Chapter V, which will be discussed in more detail in part II.4, international transfers shall be 
allowed, as a general rule, only from one LEA to another and after receiving the authorization of 
the originating Member State. For example, the French police may transfer personal data received 
from the German police to the FBI only after receiving the prior authorization of the German 
authority. As there are no comparable transfer conditions in the GDPR, the provisions on transfers 
under the Directive may be explained by the Council’s and the European Parliament’s desire to 
keep the original controller of operational law enforcement data in control over the use of such 
data by final recipients. The three-step architecture of conditions for international transfers 
(adequacy decision - appropriate safeguards - derogations) under the GDPR is replicated in the 
Directive, but the approach to data transfers by way of appropriate safeguards gives more 
flexibility to controllers, allowing them to carry out a self-assessment of such safeguards (Article 
37(1)(b)). Finally, Article 39 is a very specific and novel provision providing for, as an exception 
from the rule, so-called asymmetrical transfers from a LEA in a Member State to private parties 
in third countries. This Article will be very useful for contacts between EU LEAs and service 
providers overseas, in particular in the fight against cybercrime and cyber-enabled crime. 
Finally, chapters IX (implementing acts) and X (final provisions) contain usual and more 
technical provisions. 
II. Four focal points of the Directive: profiling, indirect exercise of 
data subject rights, logs, international transfers 
The second part of this Chapter will give an overview of four distinct features enshrined in 
the Directive. Due to the limitations in space and the primary purpose of this commentary to focus 
                                                 
21Articles 13(3), 15(3) and 16(4): Avoid obstructing official or legal inquiries, investigations or procedures; avoid prejudicing the 
prevention, detection, investigation, or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties; protect public 
security; protect national security; protect the rights and freedoms of others. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3285873 
Cole/Boehm GDPR Commentary (forthcoming Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019) Sajfert / Quintel 
8 
 
on the GDPR, the selected provisions could only be discussed to a limited extent, albeit certainly 
meriting a more detailed analysis. The authors, therefore, decided to focus on provisions of the 
Directive that stand out for both their distinct nature and importance for practitioners. In line with 
the sequence of the Articles in the Directive, the discussion will first address automated individual 
decision making in Article 11, which might attract a lot of interest of LEAs in the context of new 
IT tools and other technical possibilities at their disposal. Furthermore, the chapter will focus on 
the indirect exercise of data subject rights under Article 17, which is a provision without an 
equivalent in the GDPR and also a game changer in improving data subject rights, compared to 
the current EU law provisions in the area of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters. Our third ray of focus falls on Article 25 and the obligation for competent authorities to 
keep logs, which is another provision without a corresponding article in the GDPR and will require 
a substantive transposition effort from both the Member States and the LEAs. 
Finally, the chapter will present the provisions on international transfers under the Directive, given 
these articles have a different logic than the ones under the GDPR and on the background that such 
transfers are becoming increasingly important in the international fight against cross-border crime.  
II.1       Article 11 
Automated individual decision-making 
1. Member States shall provide for a decision based solely on automated processing, including profiling, 
which produces an adverse legal effect concerning the data subject or significantly affects him or her, to 
be prohibited unless authorised by Union or Member State law to which the controller is subject and 
which provides appropriate safeguards for the rights and freedoms of the data subject, at least the right 
to obtain human intervention on the part of the controller. 
Despite extensively strengthened data subject rights under the Directive, specific 
provisions might not offer sufficient safeguards to protect these rights while responding to current 
needs and challenges for LEAs. In particular, trends to combine processing techniques, such as 
data mining, data matching and predictive analytics are often in conflict with fundamental data 
protection and privacy rights. These types of processing operations as well as different forms of 
profiling might be covered by different provisions22 of the Directive, whereas Art. 11 is limited to 
decision-making solely based on automated means. Where processing involves (profiling-based) 
decision making that is not solely based on automated means, any ‘preliminary profiling’ would 
not be covered under Art. 11 of the Directive.23 For example, the Italian Lombardy region created 
a designated census of its Roma population.24 If the purpose of this census would be to facilitate 
prosecution of crime committed by the members of that community, it could have constituted a 
form of ethnic profiling prohibited by Art. 11, but evidently, such census will not be carried out 
solely by automated means. Only once a created profile is subsequently processed by solely 
automated means, this will trigger the applicability of the provision. 
                                                 
22 Articles 4 (principles relating to processing of personal data), Article 8 (lawfulness of processing), Article 10 (processing of 
special categories of personal data) and Articles 13 to 17 (information to be made available or given to the data subject, right of 
access by the data subject, limitations to the right of access, right to rectification or erasure of personal data and restriction of 
processing, and exercise of rights by the data subject and verification by the supervisory authority). 
23 WP29, ‘Guidelines on Automated individual decision-making and Profiling’, p. 23. 
24 Decision of the Lombardy Regional Council NOXI/40 of 3 July 2018, also reported about in La Stampa at 
http://www.lastampa.it/2018/07/04/esteri/lombardy-moves-forward-with-roma-census-
DoA54EOBA3srT6LE3d1lVO/pagina.html, last accessed on 8 September 2018. 
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The wording of Art. 11 suggests that the Directive could, hypothetically, provide stronger data 
protection standards regarding automated processing than the GDPR. While the latter stipulates, 
in its Art. 22, that data subjects ‘shall have the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on 
automated processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning him or her or 
similarly significantly affects him or her’, Art. 11 of the Directive prohibits such processing if it 
‘produces an adverse legal effect concerning the data subject or significantly affects him or her’. 
Thus, the Directive seems to provide more clarity regarding its terminology, referring to any 
significant effect caused by automated processing. While Art. 11 of the Directive clearly represents 
a prohibition, it could be argued that under Art. 22 GDPR, data subjects presumably have to assert 
their rights procedurally.25 On the other hand, the WP29, in their Guidelines on automated 
individual decision-making and profiling,26 suggest interpreting the provision of the GDPR as a 
prohibition.27 Admittedly, there are strong arguments for interpreting Art. 22 GDPR as a right as 
well as a prohibition and those sets of arguments have to survive the test of time. 
The GDPR is not limited to adverse legal effects, but includes all outcomes legally affecting data 
subjects as a result of automated decision-making processes.28 However, it could be argued that 
Art. 22 GDPR kicks in only when data subjects are being affected by legal effects or similarly 
significantly affected by the outcome of the automated decision-making, while the language in 
the Directive is stronger and more straightforward, prohibiting automated decision-making when 
the data subject is significantly affected, without requiring a correlation with a legal effect. 
II.1.1. Focus on the individual’s rights: a potential loophole? 
Neither Art. 11 nor the recitals of the Directive define what constitutes an ‘adverse legal 
effect’, according to Bygrave, however, legal effects ‘alter or determine a person’s legal rights or 
duties’ either partly or entirely.29 Presumably, the Directive refers to results of automated 
processing that affect the legal status of a data subject by altering his or her legal rights negatively. 
On this account, it should also be mentioned that both the GDPR and the Directive merely prohibit 
individual decision-making. Consequently, collective or group profiling would not fall within the 
scope of Art. 11. However, competent authorities might create profiles of groups during border 
surveillance or police monitoring operations, despite the fact that such groups have a collective 
interest of protecting their privacy and enjoying the same data protection rights as those that are 
granted to individuals. Due to this current loophole in EU data protection law, the interests of these 
groups of individuals are not protected.30 
‘[…] unless authorised by Union or Member State law to which the controller is subject and which 
provides appropriate safeguards for the rights and freedoms of the data subject […]’ 
Reference to Recital 38 of the Directive suggests that ‘appropriate safeguards’ consist of 
the provision of specific information to the data subject, including the right to obtain an 
                                                 
25 Mario Martini, ‘DS-GVO Art. 22 Automatisierte Entscheidungen im Einzelfall einschließlich Profiling‘, in: Boris P. Paal und 
Daniel Pauly (eds.), Datenschutz-Grundverordnung (1st edn, beck-online 2017). Rn 29. 
26 WP29, ‘Guidelines on Automated individual decision-making and Profiling’. 
27 Ibid, p. 8. 
28 Mario Martini, ‚DS-GVO Art. 22 Automatisierte Entscheidungen im Einzelfall einschließlich Profiling‘,Rn 28; Martini questions 
whether the GDPR refers to adverse legal effects and mentions the German Bundesdatenschutzgesetz, which only includes negative 
legal effects and finds that the GDPR’s wording is less clear in that regard. 
29 Lee A. Bygrave, ‘Automated Profiling: Minding the Machine: Article 15 of the EC Data Protection Directive and Automated 
Profiling’, in: Computer Law & Security Review, 17.1 (2001), 17–24. 
30 Cf. Brent Mittelstadt, ‘From Individual to Group Privacy in Big Data Analytics’, in: Philos. Technol. (2017) 30: 475. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-017-0253-7. 
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explanation of a decision that has been taken concerning him or her subsequent to the automated 
processing operation. In addition, data subjects should, according to that recital, have the right to 
challenge such a decision. However, the non-binding nature of recitals, the legal nature of the 
Directive (depending on its transposition in the Member States), and its applicability in the law 
enforcement area (naturally leaving more discretion to the controller), indicate that such a right to 
information is not to be treated as being equivalent to the right enshrined in Article 15(h) GDPR, 
which provides for the right to obtain information of the existence of automated decision-making 
and the logic involved in such processing. However, under the Directive, data controllers shall 
provide data subjects with the information set out in Article 13, including, in specific cases, 
information concerning the legal basis of the processing, the data retention period and the 
categories of recipients of the personal data. The controllers will be obliged to provide such 
information customarily. 
II.1.2. Understanding policing through mathematical models  
The right to ‘express his or her point of view, to obtain an explanation of the decision 
reached after such assessment or to challenge the decision’ as set out in Recital 38, however, is 
not explicitly contained in Art. 11. It could be argued that the text of the said recital is explaining 
the last part of Article 11(1), i.e. 'at least the right to obtain human intervention on the part of the 
controller'. However, obtaining an explanation of a specific decision might prove difficult, due to 
the recital’s non-binding character and because a majority of algorithms are protected by trade 
secrets or intellectual property rights.31 Consequently, these restraints limit the possibility to 
challenge a decision that is based on automated decision-making. 
The Directive, like the CJEU in its PNR Opinion 1/1532, requires human intervention when 
processing of personal data is carried out solely by automated means. However, this obligation is 
only mandatory when a decision that might adversely affect the data subject is being taken. In 
other words, when automated processing was carried out, but no decision has been taken, the result 
of that processing operation could theoretically be used for subsequent processing. 
The right to obtain human intervention on the part of the controller remains rather uncertain in the 
texts of both the GDPR and the LED. As the wording suggests that any human intervention in an 
automated decision-making process makes the latter no longer solely automated, that requirement 
is rather ambiguous.33 Article 11 does neither require human intervention to be anything more than 
nominal, nor does it oblige a controller to verify and scrutinize the substance, rationale or final 
decision of an automated decision-making measure.34 Would any nominal human intervention, 
regardless at what point during the processing, therefore allow data controllers to refrain from 
providing appropriate safeguards for the rights and freedoms of data subjects? The impact of 
Article 11 on clarifying the opacity of algorithms that decide what kind of action the police will 
take towards any given individual might therefore remain rather limited. 
                                                 
31 Moreover, explaining the algorithms used for law enforcement purposes might provide insight in the strategies of competent 
authorities and could potentially jeopardize ongoing investigations. See also: Sandra Wachter, Brent Mittelstadt, and Luciano 
Floridi, ‘Why a Right to Explanation of Automated Decision-Making Does Not Exist in the General Data Protection Regulation’, 
in: International Data Privacy Law, 7.2 (2017), 76–99 <https://doi.org/10.1093/idpl/ipx005>. 
32 Opinion 1/15, para. 141. 
33 Ibid. cf.: Mireille Hildebrandt, ‘The Dawn of a Critical Transparency Right for the Profiling Era’, Digital Enlightenment 
Yearbook 2012 (IOS Press 2012). And Lee A. Bygrave, ‘Automated Profiling: Minding the Machine: Article 15 of the EC Data 
Protection Directive and Automated Profiling’, (2001) 17 Computer Law & Security Review 17. 
34 Martini,(n 1). Rn 16-19. 
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2. Decisions referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall not be based on special categories of personal 
data referred to in Article 10, unless suitable measures to safeguard the data subject's rights and 
freedoms and legitimate interests are in place. 
The second paragraph of Article 11 resembles Article 22(4) GDPR, with the exception that 
the GDPR, in Article 9, prohibits processing based on special categories of data, unless, pursuant 
to paragraph 2(a) and (g) of that Article, certain conditions for derogating (allowing such 
processing based on the explicit consent of the data subject or processing for purposes of public 
security), are satisfied. A general prohibition to be contained also in the Directive was proposed 
by the EP after the first reading35 and recommended by the EDPS36, however, not maintained in 
the final text of the Directive. It is, therefore, essential to understand what the suitable safeguards 
required by the Directive in this provision are. Certain guidance is provided in Recital 37, which 
suggests, inter alia, the possibility to collect sensitive data only in connection with other data on 
the natural person concerned, to secure the data collected adequately, to implement stricter rules 
regarding the access to sensitive data by law enforcement staff, and a prohibition to transfer such 
data. In addition, the verification of data accuracy, the application of ethical guidelines and 
combining profiling based on sensitive data with traditional methods of investigation would be an 
imaginable tool to ensure the lawfulness of processing. For example, profiling individuals based 
solely on religious beliefs is prohibited. However, if an individual, for which there is a reasonable 
suspicion of involvement in terrorist activities, is a member of a religious group, it might be 
necessary to take automated decisions based on his or her personal data related to the worshipping 
place, religious preachers etc.  
3. Profiling that results in discrimination against natural persons on the basis of special categories of 
personal data referred to in Article 10 shall be prohibited, in accordance with Union law. 
In return, Article 11(3) of the Directive stipulates an absolute prohibition of discriminatory 
profiling based on special categories of data37, a provision that is non-existent in Article 22 of the 
GDPR. Thus, in order to be lawful, a profile may not consist of data purely relating to i.e. the race, 
ethnicity or religious affiliation of the data subject38 if its use could lead to any discrimination of 
the data subject that would not be objectively and reasonably justified. The police should ‘[…] 
carry out their tasks in a fair manner, guided in particular by the principles of impartiality and 
non-discrimination’.39 This provision under Article 11(3) is to be welcomed, as the risk of 
discriminatory and racial profiling seems to be particularly high in the context of data retention, 
predictive policing, surveillance40 and the technological developments regarding such methods.41 
                                                 
35 Article 8, European Parliament legislative resolution of 12 March 2014 on the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the 
purposes of prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, and the 
free movement of such data; P7_TA(2014)0219. 
36 ‘A further step towards comprehensive EU data protection’, EDPS recommendations on the Directive for data protection in the 
police and justice sector’; EDPS Opinion 6/2015,, p.7. 
37 Which was not included in the COM proposal from 2012, but first in the EP’s decision after the first reading (Article 9(2b)) from 
March 2014. See: European Parliament legislative resolution of 12 March 2014; P7_TA(2014)0219. 
38 Understanding and Preventing Discriminatory Ethnic Profiling: A Guide ; towards More Effective Policing, ed. by Europäische 
Union (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publ. of the Europ. Union, 2010). P. 20. 
39 Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, Recommendation Rec(2001)10 on the European Code of Police Ethics, 19 
September 2001 and Explanatory Memorandum, available at: http://www.coe.int/t/cm/adoptedTexts_en.asp. Para. 40. 
40 Linda E. Fisher, ‘Guilt by Expressive Association: Political Profiling, Surveillance and the Privacy of Groups’, Ariz. L. Rev., 46 
(2004), 621. 
41 However, even if such sensitive data are deleted during the data collection phase, the aggregation of ‘non-sensitive’ data may 
easily allow to draw conclusions about data subjects that reveal similar information. 
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Two requirements that apply to profiling measures under the GDPR and that would have been 
advisable to impose also when carrying out automated decision-making under the Directive are 
(1) the obligation to conduct a DPIA prior to such processing and (2) the right to obtain information 
concerning the consequences of automated processing as stipulated in Article 15(f) GDPR. 
Although representing a new obligation for data controllers introduced under the Directive, a DPIA 
needs not to be carried out for the sake of profiling, as is particularly the case under Article 35(3)(a) 
of the GDPR. However, Article 27 of the Directive requires that, whenever the processing (in 
particular when using new technologies) is likely to result in a high risk for individuals, a DPIA 
needs to be carried out in order to mitigate data protection risks as good as possible.42 This 
requirement will become very relevant regarding the use of new technologies for data mining 
techniques, predictive analysis and profiling by competent authorities.43 
In the area of law enforcement, consequences following specific processing operations of personal 
data may be specifically pertinent for the data subjects concerned, particularly in the case of data 
breaches (Article 30(c)). That is why data breaches should be communicated to the data subject 
unless this would jeopardize ongoing investigations (Article 31(5)). In certain cases, such as for 
minor offences, obligatory notification by the controller or processor would be appropriate. 
II. 2      Article 17 
Exercise of rights by the data subject and verification by the supervisory authority 
1. In the cases referred to in Article 13(3), Article 15(3) and Article 16(4) Member States shall adopt 
measures providing that the rights of the data subject may also be exercised through the competent 
supervisory authority. 
The provisions of Chapter III of the Directive grant data subjects the right to address data 
controllers directly with their requests (for access and subsequent rectification, erasure and 
restriction of processing). Previously, the 2008 Framework Decision, in its Articles 17(1)(a) and 
18(1) allowed Member States to choose whether they allow data subjects to either directly assert 
their rights against the controller or through the national supervisory authority as intermediary44. 
Similar deference to Member State rules is provided for under the data protection rules applicable 
to the Second-generation Schengen Information System (SIS II), in particular under Article 41 of 
the SIS II Regulation and Article 58 of the SIS II Decision45. 
                                                 
42 Paul de Hert and Vagelis Papakonstantinou, 'The New Police and Criminal Justice Data Protection Directive, A first analysis', 
in: New Journal of European Criminal Law, Vol.7, Issue 1, 2016, p. 17. 
43 Conversely, the WP29 recommends the national legislators to place an obligation on controllers to carry out a DPIA in connection 
with automated decisions. See WP29, 'Opinion on some key issues of the Law Enforcement Directive', p. 15. 
44 Cf.: Diana Alonso Blas, ‘Ensuring effective data protection in the field of police and judicial activities’, pp. 233–250. 
45 Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on the establishment, 
operation and use of the Second-generation Schengen Information System (SIS II), OJ L 381, 28.12.2006, p. 4–23 and Council 
Decision 2007/533/JHA of 12 June 2007 on the establishment, operation and use of the Second-generation Schengen Information 
System (SIS II), OJ L 205, 7.8.2007, p. 63–84. Although already in October 2014 the SIS II Supervision Coordination Group noted 
in its report on the exercise of the rights of the data subject in the Schengen Information System, only five Member States have the 
system of indirect access to personal data in SIS – France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and Portugal, while France and 
Germany also have a direct access. In 2016, The Commission issued three proposals for: a Regulation on the establishment, 
operation and use of the Schengen Information System in the field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters, COM(2016) 883 final, a Regulation on the establishment, operation and use of the SIS in the field of border checks, 
COM(2016) 882 final, and a Regulation on the use of the SIS for the return of illegally staying third country nationals, COM(2016) 
881 final, all Brussels, 21 December 2016. The Council and the European Parliament reached an agreement on the new texts in 
June 2018, and they should be formally adopted and published in the Official Journal by the end of the year. 
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II.2.1. Strengthening data subject rights – direct access as a rule 
However, the Directive obliges controllers to accept direct requests of data subjects. In 
addition, it creates an obligation for Member States to provide for the indirect exercise of data 
subject rights through the intermediary of a supervisory authority, in cases where the controller 
has decided to limit the right of specific information to be given to the data subject (Art. 13(3)), 
the right to access (Art. 15(3)) and the right of information to the data subject about the refusal of 
his or her request for rectification, erasure of restriction of processing and concerning the reasons 
for such refusal (Art. 16(4)). All Member States will, therefore, have to oblige their LEAs to 
directly deal with data subjects’ requests and to provide data subjects with the required 
information. Member States will also have to empower their supervisory authorities to indirectly 
exercise data subject rights in case a controller decides to limit them. This two-level approach to 
the exercise of data subject rights is a novelty for almost all Member States, who have so far chosen 
to provide for either the direct or the indirect exercise of data subject rights. The new approach, 
therefore, significantly improves the situation of data subjects whose data are being processed by 
LEAs, as it introduces another line of checks by an independent supervisory authority. As a 
consequence, the new approach of the Directive will have a spill-over effect on the EU databases 
such as SIS II, as the national rules referred to in the abovementioned SIS II instruments will 
become the national laws transposing the Directive. 
II.2.2. Exercising data subject rights in three steps 
The rationale behind this novel system lies in the necessary counterbalance to the three-
step approach to the exercise of data subject rights under the Directive, which is at the same time 
different and more specific than the one of the GDPR. The first step is a simple situation in which 
the competent authority decides to fully grant data subject rights. In that scenario, the police will 
proactively inform a data suspect, in accordance with Article 13(2), that his or her data are being 
processed, communicate the legal basis for processing, disclose the applicable storage period etc. 
Most of the categories of data subjects should receive such information: victims, witnesses, 
experts, convicts, and even suspects in later stages of proceedings, when provision of such 
information would not jeopardise the investigation anymore. Upon request, the competent 
authority will also have to provide the data subject with access to his or her personal data being 
processed (Article 14) and eventually rectify inaccurate data held about him or her (Article 16(1)). 
The second step refers to a more complex situation, which requires a legislative measure allowing 
for a limitation and a necessity and proportionality assessment of such limitation, after which the 
competent authority will limit data subject rights. For instance, the competent authority will not 
provide information as to the origin of the personal data in order to protect the informant (Article 
14(g) in conjunction with Article 15(1)). In such cases, the competent authority should inform the 
data subject about the refusal to provide information relating to the origin of the personal data in 
question and the reasons that led to the refusal. 
However, in some cases, in particular when LEAs are dealing with speculative requests of data 
subjects, already providing information about the refusal to grant a certain right might present too 
much information. Sometimes the mere revelation that certain data are held in a police database 
might jeopardize ongoing investigations against a suspect. The Directive, therefore, envisages a 
third step, in which competent authorities may decide not to give any sort of information to the 
data subject and instead provide a neutral reply to his or her inquiry (Article 15(3) second sentence) 
- ‘we can neither confirm nor deny your data is being processed’. Such replies are frustrating for 
data subjects and leave them completely in the dark. Particularly during the second step, and even 
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more the third step, the role of the supervisory authorities under this Article is crucial in order to 
ensure that data subject rights are being fully respected. 
2. Member States shall provide for the controller to inform the data subject of the possibility of exercising 
his or her rights through the supervisory authority pursuant to paragraph 1 
Article 12, which is a general provision of Chapter III, applicable to all subsequent 
provisions on data subject rights, provides in its paragraph 3 that competent authorities must 
inform the data subject in writing about the follow-up regarding his or her request without undue 
delay. Hence, competent authorities must rather quickly46 reply to data subject requests. 
Depending on their assessment, competent authorities may grant full access, rectify or delete 
personal data (step 1), can limit fully or partially the request and provide an explanation as to the 
grounds for limitation (step 2) or they might give a neutral reply to the data subject (step 3). If they 
choose to limit the rights of the data subject in line with step 2 or 3, their reply should inform the 
data subject that he or she has the possibility to exercise his or her rights indirectly through the 
intermediary vested in the supervisory authority. This valuable information should secure that the 
possibility of an indirect exercise of data subject rights is actually used in practice. 
3. Where the right referred to in paragraph 1 is exercised, the supervisory authority shall inform the data 
subject at least that all necessary verifications or a review by the supervisory authority have taken place. 
The supervisory authority shall also inform the data subject of his or her right to seek a judicial remedy. 
When data subject rights are being exercised indirectly, the supervisory authority will have 
to ensure that the competent authority lawfully processes personal data, that the data in question 
are accurate and complete, get rectified if inaccurate, deleted when processed unlawfully, etc. 
There are, therefore, a number of checks the supervisory authority needs to carry out before 
replying to the data subject’s request. However, the replies of the supervisory authorities should 
also be drafted with outmost diligence. A supervisory authority should inform the data subject 
what checks have been carried out, without revealing the reasons which led the competent 
authority to the decision to limit the rights in the first place. In case the competent authority 
provides a neutral reply that is deemed justified by the supervisory authority, the latter will not be 
able to provide the data subject with details concerning the data processed or whether any data has 
been processed, apart from the fact that it has carried out all the necessary checks. The data subject 
should in any case be informed that, if still not satisfied, he or she is entitled to seek judicial remedy 
before a competent court. 
The approach to the indirect exercise of data subject rights under Article 17, in particular, when 
the competent authority provided a neutral reply to the data subject who then faces a situation of 
not knowing which personal data are being kept about him or her, let alone whether they are 
accurate and processed lawfully, seems to be inspired by the relatively recent judgments of the 
ECtHR Roman Zakharov v. Russia47 and Szabò and Vissy v. Hungary48. In both of these judgments, 
the ECtHR required proper and independent oversight of secret surveillance and the obligatory 
                                                 
46 The WP29 Guidelines on the Directive suggest that the reply should be given within one calendar month after the receipt of a 
request. See Article 29 Working Party, WP 258, 'Opinion on some key issues of the Law Enforcement Directive', p. 19. 
47 ECtHR App no 47143/06 Roman Zakharov v. Russia (11 December 2015). 
48 ECtHR App no 37138/14 Szabò and Vissy v. Hungary (12 January 2016). 
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notification of the person under surveillance as soon such notification would no longer jeopardise 
the purpose of a surveillance measure.49 
Extracting the basic requirement of the ECtHR and translating the two judgments it into ‘data 
protection language’, it seems that the independent oversight of the lawfulness of processing 
whenever data subject rights are restricted in a way that the data subject is prevented from 
obtaining information or access to data directly from the competent authorities is imperative. 
Article 17 of the Directive empowers supervisory authorities with such an independent oversight 
in addition to the effective investigative, corrective and advisory powers that supervisory 
authorities must be equipped with under Article 47. A small caveat in the end: the authors of this 
chapter are aware of the fact that supervisory authorities cannot act under Article 17 if the 
competent LEA limiting data subject rights is in fact a (criminal) court acting in its judicial 
capacity, given that the supervisory authorities do not have any competence over courts acting in 
their judicial capacity (Article 45(2)). 
 
II.3       Article 25 
Logging 
1. Member States shall provide for logs to be kept for at least the following processing operations in 
automated processing systems: collection, alteration, consultation, disclosure including transfers, 
combination and erasure. The logs of consultation and disclosure shall make it possible to establish the 
justification, date and time of such operations and, as far as possible, the identification of the person who 
consulted or disclosed personal data, and the identity of the recipients of such personal data. 
The obligation to keep logs of six processing operations in automated processing systems 
is a distinct feature of the Directive, without any equivalent provision in the GDPR. It is a much 
stronger obligation compared to the one under Article 10 of the 2008 Framework Decision, which, 
due to its purely cross-border nature, required logging or documentation only for transmissions 
of personal data. In EU law, the importance of logs is recognized in instruments such as the SIS II 
and the Visa Information System (VIS)50, which focus on that issue in much more detail than the 
Framework Decision.51 In the SIS II for instance, every access to and all exchanges of personal 
data within the central system have to be logged and these logs should be kept between one and 
three years, so that both the competent authorities internally and the independent supervisory 
authorities externally are able to verify whether searches in the database have been carried out 
                                                 
49 Cf.: Gianclaudio Malgieri and Paul De Hert, 'European Human Rights, Criminal Surveillance, and Intelligence Surveillance: 
Towards “Good Enough” Oversight, Preferably but Not Necessarily by Judges', in: Gray, D. and Henderson, S. (eds), The 
Cambridge Handbook of Surveillance Law, Cambridge University Press, 2018; Cole/Quintel, ‘“Is there anybody out there?” –
Retention of Communications Data: Analysis of the status quo in light of the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), Carolina Academic Press Global Papers Series (forthcoming 
2019). 
50 Regulation (EC) No 767/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 concerning the Visa Information 
System (VIS) and the exchange of data between Member States on short-stay visas (VIS Regulation), OJ P. 120 – 141. In May 
2018, the Commission issued a proposal for the revision of the VIS, see: Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and 
of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 767/2008, Regulation (EC) No 810/2009, Regulation (EU) 2017/2226, Regulation 
(EU) 2016/399, Regulation XX/2018 [Interoperability Regulation], and Decision 2004/512/EC and repealing Council Decision 
2008/633/JHA, COM(2018) 302 final, Brussels, 16.5.2018. 
51 For example, Article 12 of the SIS II Decision or Article 34 of the VIS Regulation, although in those texts logs are referred to as 
‘records’. 
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lawfully, by persons authorised to access the SIS II, and whether the reasons for access were 
justified. 
This consolidation of the obligation to keep logs under the Directive as a comprehensive horizontal 
instrument, and its expansion compared to the Framework Decision is significant: from one 
processing operation (transmission) to six (collection, alteration, consultation, disclosure including 
transfers, combination and erasure); from a choice between logging or documenting to a 
standalone provision on logs, given that keeping documentation (records) is already stipulated in 
Article 24 of the Directive; and the applicability of the provision to all automated processing 
systems, which practically means that all law enforcement databases must be in compliance with 
the obligation to keep logs. As law enforcement databases contain high volumes of information on 
a large number of individuals, a lot of which are sensitive data, the logs play a central role in 
ensuring that such databases are not being abused and are only accessed by persons with proper 
authorization and with valid reasons to access retained data. 
Out of six processing operations covered by this provision, the Directive gives particular 
importance to two processes: consultation and disclosure. These are the most common and also 
the riskiest processing activities in databases, which is why the Directive provides a lot of detail 
on the exact content of such logs. Firstly, these logs should identify the person who consults the 
database or who discloses the information from the database to a third party.52 Secondly, in case 
of disclosure, the recipients of personal data should be identified as well. Thirdly, the exact date 
and time of the consultation or disclosure must be recorded as the basic feature of logs. Fourthly 
and most intriguingly, a hitherto unprecedented requirement to be included in logs is the 
justification for performing a processing operation. When reading a log, it must be possible to 
conclude why a certain officer consulted a database or disclosed data to a third party. The 
justification may be demonstrated in different ways, depending on the nature of the database, its 
technical features and the user profile. Sometimes it will be sufficient to identify the user and 
understand why a certain database was consulted (as Recital 57 suggests). In other cases, databases 
will have to include a drop-down menu or a free field where the user will record the justification 
for consulting it. 
Due to all of the new abovementioned logging requirements, the implementation of this provision 
might prove to be costly and/or technically difficult, in particular for older automated processing 
systems. The Directive, therefore, allows, under Articles 63(2) and (3), for a longer transposition 
period of Article 25(1), for databases set up before the entry into force of the Directive, i.e. prior 
to 6 May 2016. Exceptionally, Member States may take additional five or even eight years to 
transpose this provision by 2023 or 2026 respectively, if the transposition causes massive costs or 
jeopardizes the functioning of the database as such. 
2. The logs shall be used solely for verification of the lawfulness of processing, self-monitoring, ensuring the 
integrity and security of the personal data, and for criminal proceedings. 
Competent authorities have to carefully comply with the provisions that lay down the rules 
on the keeping of logs and documenting the purposes for which they are kept. The logs reveal a 
lot of information concerning the work of law enforcement officers but also about persons whose 
personal data are being consulted. They should therefore be kept and used solely for the purposes 
known from the 2008 Framework Decision, the SIS II and the VIS rules (verification of lawfulness 
                                                 
52 See in particular Rec. 57, second sentence. 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3285873 
Cole/Boehm GDPR Commentary (forthcoming Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019) Sajfert / Quintel 
17 
 
of processing, self-monitoring, integrity and security of the personal data) and for one new purpose 
introduced by the Directive – for criminal proceedings.  
Logs can nowadays be kept through a log collector and monitored by a dedicated team within the 
competent authority through random checks of the log files and pre-defined automatic alerts, in 
order to discover potential misuses of information. It is possible to programme the alerts so that 
they notify the person responsible about any unusual or unauthorised operation in a database. The 
self-monitoring also includes disciplinary proceedings against law enforcement officers breaking 
or bending the rules, such as the ones abusing their access rights in order to check personal data of 
celebrities or random cars parked in front of their girlfriends’ houses. If properly kept and 
monitored, logs are a powerful tool to prevent law enforcement officers from grave personal data 
breaches, such as the one recently discovered within Europol, where an employee took home and 
leaked an entire database online53. Moreover, logs may also be used in criminal proceedings as 
e.g. evidence in criminal proceedings against law enforcement officers selling police data on the 
DarkNet. But, they could also be used in criminal proceedings against a perpetrator of another type 
of a crime. For example, by matching logs of consultation of a border control database, conclusions 
can be reached about movements of a suspect. However, logs are above all safeguards and should 
not lead to further interferences with the right to privacy and data protection. The WP29, therefore, 
suggest a narrower reading of Article 25(2) where the use of logs in criminal proceedings would 
be adequate only when the lawfulness of a data processing operation is being challenged, when 
there is a security breach in dispute, or if the integrity of data is at stake.54 
3. The controller and the processor shall make the logs available to the supervisory authority on request. 
Ultimately, it will be up to the supervisory authorities to breathe life into the obligation of 
competent authorities to keep logs. Relying solely on self-monitoring would prevent the full 
exercise of different investigative of corrective powers of the supervisory authorities. It is crucial 
that the competent authorities keep logs for a certain period of time, ideally not less than two 
years55, in order to allow for enough time for regular checks by supervisory authorities. They need 
to confirm whether self-monitoring is being done properly and if suspicious behaviour of law 
enforcement officers is being investigated and sanctioned internally. The supervisory authorities 
should, therefore, regularly carry out random checks of logs and use their corrective powers against 
competent authorities who do not properly monitor and sanction the staff abusing their respective 
access rights to law enforcement databases. 
II.4       CHAPTER V 
Transfers of personal data to third countries or international organisations 
Articles 35-39 of Directive 2016/680 
Transfers by EU LEAs to third countries must satisfy the conditions for international 
transfers laid down in Chapter V of the LED. Due to the different level of data protection standards 
within the EU versus other parts of the world, Articles 35 to 38 stipulate additional restrictions to 
processing operations, applicable when personal data are leaving the Union. The articles in Chapter 
V are divided into General Conditions for international transfers, transfers on the basis of 
                                                 
53 See: http://www.nu.nl/binnenland/4357991/terrorismedossiers-straat-groot-veiligheidslek-europol.html. 
54 See: WP29, 'Opinion on some key issues of the Law Enforcement Directive', p. 27. 
55 On this issue, the WP29 suggests a case-by-case approach and a differentiation between access logs and the logs on the history 
of data. See: WP29, 'Opinion on some key issues of the Law Enforcement Directive', pp. 27 and 28. 
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Adequacy Decisions adopted by the Commission, transfers subject to Appropriate Safeguards, 
and Derogations from the general conditions for transfers in specific situations. Article 39 lays 
down the conditions for so-called Asymmetrical Transfers, that take place from LEAs in the EU 
Member States to private entities established in third countries. 
II.4.1. Structure of international transfers under the Directive 
Under the Directive, the logic applied to international transfers differs from the one applied 
under the GDPR, however, the architecture of Chapter V in both instruments is the same. 
Apart from the requirement for international transfers to be based on an adequacy decision by the 
Commission, which is adopted along the same procedure as an adequacy decision under the 
GDPR56, the general principles for international transfers, set out in Article 35 of the Directive, 
are different from the ones stipulated under the GDPR. First, such transfers must be necessary for 
the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the 
execution of criminal penalties, including the safeguarding against and the prevention of threats to 
public security. Second, and as a general rule, international data transfers may only take place via 
official channels, hence, from one LEA in the EU to another LEA in the third country receiving 
the data. This provision in the Directive is similar to Article 13 of its predecessor, the 2008 
Framework Decision, but, other than under the Framework Decision, and as an important novelty, 
is subject to certain derogations that will be elaborated below. 
II.4.2. The originating Member State behind the steering wheel of international transfers 
Where a Member State transfers data that were obtained from another Member State, the 
latter must, pursuant to Article 35(1)(c), authorize such an international transfer before it may be 
executed. This procedure can, in situations of an immediate threat to public security, be accelerated 
and may, pursuant to paragraph 2, take place without prior authorisation. 
Onward transfers of personal data by third country authorities must be authorised by the competent 
authority of the Member State from which the transfer originated57. For example, if a French 
authority would transfer personal data to an US authority, the latter would solely be allowed to 
further transfer such data to a Brazilian authority after the French authority authorised such an 
onward transfer. 
II.4.3. The three-step cascade system 
As mentioned above, the conditions for adequacy decisions adopted by the Commission 
for international transfers are equivalent to the ones under the GDPR58. Thus, it will be for the 
Commission to decide whether a third country ensures an adequate level of protection for personal 
data within the scope of the Directive. According to Recital 6759 of the Directive, a third country 
                                                 
56 An adequacy decision under the Directive is also a condition for international transfers by Europol to authorities of third countries, 
pursuant to Article 25 (1)(a) of Regulation (EU) 2016/794 of 11 May 2016. Likewise, according to Rec. 71, controllers, when 
assessing circumstances surrounding international transfers not based on an adequacy decision, should take into account 
cooperation agreements between Europol and Eurojust concluded with third countries. 
57 Taking into account inter alia, the seriousness of a crime, the purpose for which the personal data was originally transferred and 
the level of personal data protection in the third country or an international organization to which personal data are onward 
transferred. Compare with the EU-US Umbrella Agreement, Art. 7. 
58 According to Rec. 68, relevant adequacy decisions adopted under Article 45 GDPR should be taken into account when assessing 
the level of protection in third countries for the purpose of international transfers under the Police Directive. 
59 Recital (104) of the GDPR. 
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should generally be able to provide a level of data protection that is ‘essentially equivalent to that 
ensured within the Union’, as further required by the CJEU in its Schrems60 judgment. 
In the absence of the aforesaid decision, and in order to allow for more flexibility, the second step 
in the cascade are international transfers subject to appropriate safeguards. Article 37 foresees two 
situations in which such appropriate safeguards may exist, thereby departing from the similarities 
with, and being less specific than Article 46 of the GDPR. In the first option any appropriate 
safeguard shall be guaranteed in a legally binding and enforceable instrument, to provide 
administrative or judicial redress to the data subject concerned. A typical example of an instrument 
created to become this first option in accordance with Article 37 is the EU-US Umbrella 
Agreement.61 Another option provided for by Article 37 is a decision to transfer data based on a 
self-assessment evaluation carried out by the controller. In such a case, the controller must evaluate 
the circumstances of the transfer with regard to the existing data protection standards in the 
recipient state, must inform the supervisory authority of the categories of data included in such 
transfer and document the transfer for potential review by the supervisory authority. 
The final step of the cascade is Article 38, under which the Directive allows Member States, in 
certain situations, to derogate from the conditions under Articles 36 and 37. Derogations are only 
permitted in individual cases and solely if they serve to protect the interests of the data subject, if 
they are instrumental for the prevention of an immediate threat, or the establishment, exercise or 
defence of legal claims. Where the fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject prevail 
over the public interest, international transfers on the basis of Article 38 may not take place. 
II.4.4. A novelty – asymmetrical transfers 
As the most innovative provision of Chapter V, the Directive, under Article 39, provides 
the data protection framework for data requests from LEAs in EU Member States directly to 
private parties in third countries. Since the procedures for requests via official channels may be 
very lengthy62, such asymmetrical transfers anticipate the prevention of obstacles and smoother, 
direct cooperation with third country service providers. For that purpose, Article 39 imposes a 
number of conditions on the competent authorities in the Member States for data requests 
addressed to service providers in third countries, thereby derogating, in individual and specific 
cases, from the requirements in Article 35 to use the official channels only. 
However, in order for Article 39 to apply, all other conditions of the Directive need to be satisfied. 
The legal basis for such transfers must be laid down in Union or Member State law (Article 8) and 
an adequacy decision under Article 36, appropriate safeguards pursuant to Article 37, or an 
individual derogation from Article 38 must exist, in line with the cascade described above. In 
addition, transfers under Article 39 must be strictly necessary for the investigation of a particular 
criminal offence; thus, fishing expeditions or bulk transfers are not permitted. This requirement 
calls for a strong link between the main tasks of the transferring authority and the necessity to 
transfer personal data. The fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject may not override 
the public interest for the purpose(s) of which the transfer is carried out and the service providers 
must be informed about the purpose(s) for which the transferred data may be processed. 
                                                 
60 CJEU C-362/14, Maximilian Schrems, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650. 
61 Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the protection of personal information relating to 
the prevention, investigation, detection, and prosecution of criminal offences, OJ L 336, 10.12.2016, p. 3–13. 
62 In the fight against cyber-crime, LEAs in the European Union will often perceive the mutual legal assistance channels as being 
too slow and will have to establish a direct contact with a service provider in a third country (e.g. Microsoft, Apple, Yahoo, Google, 
Facebook, Twitter etc). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3285873 
Cole/Boehm GDPR Commentary (forthcoming Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019) Sajfert / Quintel 
20 
 
Furthermore, a direct transfer to service providers may only take place if the competent authority 
in the State of the establishment of the recipient is not trustworthy or overwhelmed with requests, 
meaning that data exchanges cannot be carried out in a timely manner via the official channels. 
The third country authority should nevertheless be informed of the transfer, but again, if the 
authority is corrupt or unavailable (i.e. in a failed state) or simply prefers not to be notified, the 
competent authority in the transferring Member State does not have to comply with this 
requirement. 
II.4.5. Stronger role for the supervisory authorities 
 The strict legal framework under which derogations for asymmetrical transfers may occur 
is monitored by the (vigilant) eyes of the supervisory authorities in the EU Member States. They 
must be informed whenever transfers under Article 39 of the Directive are carried out and have 
the power to ex post review documented transfers. The national supervisory authorities are 
therefore required to invest much more resources and to approach their respective police and 
criminal justice authorities with greater authority, compared to the situation before the entry into 
force of the LED. 
II.4.6. International data exchange agreements with third countries 
Because data processing in the field of judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police 
cooperation was, until recently, mainly left outside the scope of EU law, a vast majority of EU 
Member States concluded bilateral or multilateral agreements for the transmission and exchange 
of personal data to and with third countries.63 Since Article 39 is without prejudice to these 
international agreements in force between the Member States and third countries, such agreements 
could, in theory, allow less strict standards for asymmetrical transfers than those required under 
the Directive. However, no such agreements are currently in force64, and, as part of the EU acquis, 
the Directive prevents Member States from entering into international agreements that could 
dissolve the exceptional character of asymmetrical transfers and loosen the conditions stipulated 
in Article 39. Thus, if, in the future, Member States enter into international agreements on the 
exchange of data held by private parties, the data protection conditions laid down under these 
agreements may not be weaker than the ones pursuant to Article 39. When contacting service 
providers in third countries, LEAs in Member States will therefore have to show compliance with 
the data protection standards under the LED. 
II.4.7. The particularities of international transfers in the area of law enforcement 
The LED aims at balancing the flexibility needed for carrying out transfers to third 
countries for the purposes set out in Article 1(1) with the data protection rights of the individuals 
concerned. While such flexibility is required for the investigation of criminal offences and the 
safeguarding of public security, when personal data move across borders this may put at increased 
risk the ability of natural persons to exercise their data protection rights and to protect themselves 
from the unlawful use or disclosure of their personal data.65 Oversight powers by supervisory 
                                                 
63 Eurojus 'Balance between Security and Fundamental Rights Protection: An Analysis of the Directive 2016/680 for Data 
Protection in the Police and Justice Sectors and the Directive 2016/681 on the Use of Passenger Name Record (PNR)', p.7. 
64 The first international agreement explicitly allowing for direct cooperation between EU LEAs and the service providers in a third 
country, and vice versa, is the UK-US agreement currently being negotiated. See more at 
https://www.hatch.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/releases?ID=D82974EA-BA0C-494B-A3A1-89A7926FB802. 
Also, in April 2017 Google asked for a new approach to cross-border access to electronical evidence. See 
https://www.blog.google/topics/public-policy/international-framework-digital-evidence/. 
65 Rec. 74 of Directive 2016/680. 
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authorities within the Member States will be much reduced once the data has left the European 
Union. This is particularly true for onward transfers by third countries and international transfers 
that are carried out without establishing their basis on an adequacy decision. The execution of 
international transfers requires close overview by the Member States’ supervisory authorities, 
strict interpretation of derogations and ex post review of documented transfers in order to protect 
data subjects’ fundamental rights. 
While the Directive certainly contributes to a less fragmented general framework for international 
transfers, it cannot cover all the fields in which transfers of data might take place. Pursuant to 
Article 2(3)(a) of the Directive and as mentioned previously, transfers of personal data between 
authorities responsible for safeguarding national security will not be covered by the provisions, as 
these generally fall outside the scope of the Directive. This may particularly become problematic 
in Member States where intelligence agencies and LEAs form part of the same organizational 
structure and data are commonly exchanged between these authorities.66 
III. Conclusion 
Article 16 of the TFEU conferred very broad competences to the Union to legislate on data 
protection matters. On the basis of this provision, it would have been possible to establish a 
uniform data protection regime applicable to all processing operations of personal data falling 
within the scope of EU law. However, one size does not fit all, and the co-legislators, therefore, 
opted for a separate legal instrument, the Directive for police and criminal justice authorities. The 
LED adopts some of the GDPR’s solutions, but also has many standalone, distinct features. The 
Directive is undoubtedly a major step forward67 compared to the data protection rules the EU had 
established under its third pillar (Justice and Home Affairs) prior to the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty. 
The Directive contains a comprehensive and forward-looking set of rules, receptive towards law 
enforcement activities in the Digital Age. This was demonstrated on the examples of principles 
(purpose limitation and data minimisation) that are more flexible than the equivalent provisions 
under the GDPR. The same holds true for some of the novel features introduced by the Directive, 
such as the use of logs for criminal proceedings, the possibility for competent authorities to carry 
out a self-assessment of appropriate safeguards surrounding international transfers, or the 
derogation allowing international transfers directly to private parties in third countries. 
At the same time, the LED empowers data subjects with a strong set of rights and offers a higher 
level of protection. This chapter presented the additional safeguards on which data subjects may 
rely, for instance, against automated individual decision-making. Moreover, the mechanism for 
independent oversight by competent authorities through the supervisory authorities and the 
indirect exercise of data subject rights were illustrated and the detailed rules on the obligation for 
competent authorities to keep logs of the processing activities in law enforcement databases, as 
one of many new obligations of the competent authorities under the Directive were explained. 
Finally, the chapter laid down the conditions that must be followed when transfers of personal data 
to third countries are carried out. 
                                                 
66 For instance, in Lithuania, Poland or Sweden. 
67 See Paul de Hert and Vagelis Papakonstantinou, 'The New Police and Criminal Justice Data Protection Directive', p. 17 and 
Thomas Marquenie ‘The Police and Criminal Justice Authorities Directive: Data protection standards and impact on the legal 
framework’, Computer Law & Security Review, 33 (2017), 324-340. 
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In the context of the ongoing ‘privacy v security’ discussion, the Directive shows that it now will 
be possible to achieve high privacy and data protection standards while processing personal data 
for law enforcement purposes in a more flexible manner. It would, therefore, be instrumental to 
shift the public debate from the false paradigm that either one or the other may be achieved. Today, 
the LED presents a benchmark for the consolidation and alignment of other EU data protection 
rules in the area of police cooperation and judicial cooperation with its rules (Article 62(6))68. 
Despite all, the effectiveness of the Directive will largely depend on its transposition within the 
legal system of each individual Member State. The general applicability of the Directive and the 
wide discretion of national legislators as to achieving the instrument’s objectives might lead to 
considerable variations among the Member States, as was the case with the implementation of, for 
instance, Article 15 of the DPD.69 In particular, there are risks of an overly broad interpretation of 
the scope of the Directive, at the expense of the GDPR. This situation is generated by the 
ambiguous language of Article 1(1) of the Directive and its accompanying Recital 12. They seem 
to broaden the applicability of the Directive from the core criminal law enforcement realm to the 
‘safeguarding against and the prevention of threats to public security’ when certain police actions, 
such as undertaken during the major sporting events, riots or demonstrations may or may not lead 
to a criminal offence. Moreover, despite Recital 13 of the Directive, the latter left the notion of 
‘criminal offence’ completely undefined, thereby making it entirely dependent on the 
interpretation of that notion under national law. The powers of supervisory authorities are yet 
another area where the transposition might turn out to be fragile, while the full potential of the 
Directive can be achieved only through a strong enforcement of its rules by these authorities. This 
is another weakness of the Directive, concretely its Article 47. Unlike the GDPR, which is very 
explicit on the powers of the supervisory authorities in its Article 58, the Directive does not oblige 
the Member States to vest their national supervisory authorities with any particular corrective 
powers in respect of police and criminal justice authorities, rather providing a few examples under 
Article 47(2) and introducing a general requirement that such powers need to be effective. In any 
event, there are no valid reasons to undermine the full transposition of the Directive, given that 
‘the police should follow what is in the Directive anyway’.70 
                                                 
68 By May 2019, the Commission has to propose the alignment of regimes such as Prüm (Council Decision 2008/615/JHA of 23 
June 2008 on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime, OJ L 210, 
6.8.2008, p. 1–11 and Council Decision 2008/616/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the implementation of Decision 2008/615/JHA on the 
stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime, OJ L 210, 6.8.2008, p. 12–
72) or the Swedish Initiative (Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA of 18 December 2006 on simplifying the exchange of 
information and intelligence between law enforcement authorities of the Member States of the European Union, OJ L 386, 
29.12.2006, p. 89–100). Moreover, the rules of the Directive have been taken over for some EU agencies active in this area. See in 
particular the Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment 
of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (‘the EPPO’), OJ L 283, 31.10.2017, p. 1–71. 
 
70 Valsamis Mitsilegas, scholar of European Criminal Law at Queen Mary University of London, during the House of Lords EU 
Committee session on Brexit and EU data protection, 17 July 2017. 
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